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Critique of Intelligent Design

Evolution vs. Creationism

The Art of ID Stuntmen

Faith vs Reason

Anthropic Principle

Autopsy of the Bible code

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Historical Notes

Counter-Apologetics

Serious Notions with a Smile

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Letter Serial Correlation

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Letters

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Title Author Date
James Downard Berlinski, David Jul 15, 2003
Paris

Dear Editor --

I have just had occasion to read in the most recent Talk-Reason James
Downard's criticism of various of my Commentary essays. I appreciate his
remarks and I consider his criticism to be substantial, well-argued (within
the limits of an on-line forum), and interesting. I regret very much that
he did not publish his views in Commentary and I would even at this late
date urge him to submit a letter to the editor. I would do everything I
could to see that it is published.

Failing that, I would be happy to respond to the critical points that he
has raised on Talk-Reason itself. And if this is not acceptable, I would be
happy again to respond to his critique privately and off-line.

Sincerely,

David Berlinski
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Related Article(s):
A Tale of Two Citations

Title Author Date
the methods of the Bible code yongkiat, sim Aug 14, 2003
I would like to comment on the mathematical method that both Bible-code believers and opponents use to back up their stand. Though I'm not a believer, I've come up with a certain argument which is affecting my skepticism, and I've sent in this post hoping that someone could point out the error in my following argument, in order for me to attain a peace of mind.

I want to show that, contrary to common belief, mathematics alone actually does not tell us much whether the hidden code was placed intentionally or not. Imagine this, say Moby Dick is able to generate 10 correction predictions, yet of little importance, with the Bible generating only 5 correct yet important ones, which book gives better predictions? Obviously Moby Dick, if you define correct prediction as "true facts". Yet if you choose to define correct prediction as "important true facts", then the bible is now five
times more powerful than Moby Dick. In other words, statistical methods dealing only with numbers and quantities do not contribute much to the decision on the probability of the existence of hidden codes, for surely man is capable to judge qualities, not merely to calculate quantities, even if I cannot prove to you mathematically why Beethoven is nicer than the traffic.

Thus it is not entirely irrational for the bible-code believer to feel that there is a hidden code, for they can always believe that God would want only to talk of important and famous truths. The only decisive way to refute the believer is to come up with the same amount of quality predictions from another book of the same thickness as the Torah, instead of wasting time on the discussion of the statistical method used.
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Related Article(s):
The Rise and Fall of the Bible Code

Title Author Date
Recent Article Critical of Fine-tuning Argument for God's Existence Himma, Kenneth Jun 17, 2003
Proponents of fine-tuning arguments attempt to infer the existence of God
from the presumably improbable fact that the universe is able to support
life. Life would not be possible if any of approximately two-dozen
fundamental laws and properties of the universe had been even slightly
different; this, according to the argument, shows the existence of a
creator who deliberately created the universe for the purpose of
supporting life. In this essay, I consider the Confirmatory Version of
the argument, which relies on the following principle of confirmation
theory: if an observation O is more likely to occur under hypothesis H1
than under hypothesis H2, then O supports accepting H1 over H2. In "Prior Probabilities and Confirmation Theory: A Problem with the Fine-Tuning Argument"
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 51, no. 4 (June
2002), 175-194, I argue that the application of this principle under conditions similar to those
forming the context of the Confirmatory Version is vulnerable to
straightforward counterexamples and attempt to explain the proper
application conditions for this principle.

The article can be downloaded free of charge at:

http://www.kluweronline.com/issn/0020-7047/contents

If you think this would be of interest to your readers, please feel free
to
cite, discuss, criticize, or post a link to the document.

Best, Ken

Kenneth Einar Himma
Department of Philosophy and Information School
University of Washington
Box 353350
Seattle, WA 98195

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Title Author Date
Reply to 3 Doors (the Monty Hall show) Nord, Harald May 19, 2003
I was first reading the article "Improbable Probabilities" on professor Perakh's home-pages. Just like Nesa Simon David I also could not understand why the contestant should change his choice. I kept thinking
P(A)=P(C) even after door B had been opened. What if the contestant had chosen door C in the first place? was my thinking.

So I sent an e-mail to professor Perakh and he was kind enough to refer to the reply he had given on these pages.

Of course, the opening of door B is not a random event and the mathematical proof leaves no doubt.

I am thankful to professor Perakh for referring me to this web-site, as it contains much very interesting reading!

Kind regards Harald Nord ++
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Related Article(s):
Improbable Probabilities

Title Author Date
Open call for readers for a new critique of creationism Downard, James Mar 10, 2003
Dear Talk Reason

I am currently concluding work on the final chapter of a new book on the creation/evolution controversy, "Troubles in Paradise: The Methodology of Creationism," and would welcome any critical reviews or overall commentary on the project. In summary:

A short introduction sets the overall frame for the debate (including historical background for the dramatis personae).

Chapter one lays out the fundamental "Rules of the Game" whose application ultimately sinks pseudoscience generally and creationism in particular. All rigorous disciplines have to pay attention to all the data (not just the bits that favor their side); they have to work out clearly what they think happened (including any novel concepts they may have lurking in the wings, such as "created types"); and finally, they have to earn their reputation on the basis of being able to account for the data set better than their rivals. Antievolutionists fail pathologically in all of these categories, which explains why they are able to sustain their beliefs in spite of such daunting evidence to the contrary.

With this refreshed demarcation argument laid out, the second chapter ('Dem Bones) hits three macroevolutionary episodes head on: the Cambrian Explosion, and the origin of birds and mammals. In that latter case, when approached from the scholarly methods angle, Phillip Johnson implodes on a scale hitherto not properly appreciated (including the fine criticism of Johnson on your website). Kevin Padian (whose National Center for Science Education has been most helpful in obtaining technical reviewing for my work) had his mammal experts at Berkeley put my therapsid evidence through the critical wringer to confirm that my argument was indeed as seriously bad for Johnson as it was.

With these macroevolutionary benchmarks in hand, the next chapter (Dinomania) hits the mythology of Flood Geology, but from the fresh perspective of dinosaur paleontology. Players who haven't received much attention in print previously (such as Kent Hovind and Richard Milton) are highlighted along with the usual ICR gang.

The next chapter (Creationism Lite) dismantles Michael Behe's irreducible complexity defense and Phillip Johnson's screwball notions of the nature of science. Finn Pond (head of the biology department at Whitworth College, and critic of the Discovery Institute's Steve Meyer, late of Whitworth's philosophy department) was particularly pleased with how I used the Alu pseudogene case to highlight the weak undercarriage of Intelligent Design biology.

--continued--
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